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Abstract 
Why does the leftist party vote increase when turnout increases in some countries and not in 
others? Why does this happen in some instances in time but not in others? Thus far there exists 
no academic consensus on the relationship between turnout and electoral results. This paper 
argues that in order to adequately address these questions we need to focus on three elements: 
class voting, the mechanisms behind whether the correlation is observed over the short or long-
term, and the use of more rigorous model specifications. By looking at the cases of Spain and 
Portugal, we find a correlation in the short and long-term for Spain but not for Portugal and this 
is due namely to the prominence of class voting in the former.  
*  The authors acknowledge financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and 
Innovation, research project CSO2010-1639. 
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1. Introduction 
One of the most controversial propositions in the voting behaviour literature is that the 
higher the electoral turnout is the higher the left party vote share will be. The argument 
is parsimonious and persuasive since it is generally accepted that citizens with a higher 
socio-economic status (SES) are more likely to vote than those with a lower SES. 
Further it is assumed that citizens will have different ideological leanings based on their 
SES which is likely to manifest into party support. With this in mind, the argument 
proposes that low turnout biases election outcomes such that right-wing parties gain at 
the expense of left-of-centre alternatives (Rubenson et al, 2007: 595). However, the 
empirical evidence supporting the partisan consequences of turnout is far from 
conclusive. In a piece using data on national elections in 23 OECD countries, Fisher 
(2007) only finds statistically significant positive correlations between left share of the 
vote and turnout in five countries. Thus, after decades of research “there exists little 
scholarly agreement about either the partisan consequences of high turnout or its effect 
on incumbents in general” (Hansford and Gomez, 2010: 268). 
 
In this paper we argue that this disagreement has to do with three elements: the 
assumption that class voting exists with the same strength everywhere1, the different 
mechanisms behind the correlation between turnout and electoral results depending on 
whether the correlation is examined in the short or long-term, and the use of 
inappropriate statistical models to account for the partisan consequences of turnout.  
First, class voting differs across countries. All else equal, the correlation between 
turnout and electoral results should be higher as class voting increases. Furthermore, if 
class voting is not important at all, then voting for one party or for the other does not 
make a difference in terms of class, therefore we should not expect a significant 
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correlation. However, class inevitably is assumed to mold individual voting behavior in 
all societies in the same way. Lipset’s (1981 [1960]: 220-224) words that “in virtually 
every economically developed country the lower income groups vote mainly for parties 
of the left” captures the conventional wisdom. Consequently, as one’s socio-economic 
status is positively linked with voting, leftist parties should always benefit with high 
turnout. But why does turnout have partisan consequences in some countries, but not in 
others, during some periods but not during others?  
 
Second, as explained by Fisher (2007: 598-600), when assessing the relationship 
between turnout and the left share of vote, there are two possible questions: whether the 
left share of the vote is higher or not when turnout is relatively high (a long-term 
relationship) and whether the left share of the vote tends to increase between elections 
when turnout rises (a short-term relationship).2 We argue that the answers to these two 
questions are not necessarily similar. As Pacek and Radcliff (1995) or Martinez and Gill 
(2005), our argument is that the long-term relationship is only a function of class voting; 
in the long-run leftist and parties alternate in government and then the impact of short-
term factors, mainly the incumbent effect, cancels out or at least tends to zero. On the 
contrary, given the existence of class voting and therefore a correlation between turnout 
and the left share of the vote, the short-term relationship depends on who the ruling 
party is as higher turnout is associated with lower vote share for the incumbent. In sum, 
it is not possible to a have a compelling conclusion about the correlation in a given 
election in a particular country without clarifying if it is examined in the short or the 
long-term, and secondly, if the short-term is selected, without taking into account the 
anti-incumbent effect. In methodological terms, the main implication is that there are a 
variety of model specifications that could seem to be reasonable for the correlation 
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between turnout and the left share of the vote. Given that any particular specification 
rests on assumptions about how the two variables are connected (for instance, if they are 
differenced we are assuming that the relationship is in the short-term, but not in the 
long-term), a compelling test demands not having ex ante assumptions.  
 
We test our argument with a comparison between Portugal and Spain, two third-
wave democracies with strong differences in class voting; irrelevant in Portugal and 
significant in Spain. Relying on cross-sectional and time series cross-section analyses in 
which assumptions about whether the partisan consequences take place in the short or 
long-term are examined, our findings show that the correlation between turnout and the 
left share of the vote exists in Spain both in the long and short-terms, but not in 
Portugal, neither in the short nor in the long-term. 
  
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present our argument 
explaining cross-national differences in the correlation between turnout and the left 
share of the vote. The following sections describe the data and methods, the results of 
the empirical analysis using aggregated data, and an individual-level data analysis of the 
causal mechanisms driving the relationship between turnout and leftist support. The 
final section concludes and offers some empirical extensions. 
 
2. Arguments 
The argument linking voter turnout and electoral results rests on three substantive 
assumptions. First, there exists some degree of social and/or economic inequality in 
countries. If there are no inequalities in society then we cannot expect to find a positive 
correlation between turnout and electoral results because the differential benefit in terms 
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of class for an individual associated with the election of various legislators/governments 
would be zero. All else equal, the higher the degree of social and/or economic 
inequalities, the higher the correlation between turnout and electoral results. Second, 
voters and nonvoters can be identified by their SES. Accordingly, people of a lower 
SES have a lower propensity to vote than those of a higher socioeconomic status. If the 
SES of voters and nonvoters is the same, then turnout levels should not affect electoral 
results. Third, class voting takes place in countries and therefore people of a lower 
socioeconomic status have a higher propensity to cast ballots for leftist parties than 
those with a higher SES. If, when citizens do vote, they are not voting according to their 
SES, then there would not be a turnout-electoral results correlation. 3 
 
 While the first assumption is always met, the other two are more problematic. 
The positive relationship between SES and turnout has been repeatedly demonstrated 
(see Blais, 2000), although, as Nevitte et al (2009) or Gallego (2010) show, there are 
significant differences in the extent to which SES accounts for the variance in non-
voting across countries. However, this correlation is influenced by the existence of 
strategic behaviours encouraged by electoral systems (Cox, 1997 1999) and the number 
of viable parties in a district/polity. Two individuals with the same SES may vote or 
abstain depending on whether parties and voters behave strategically or sincerely. As a 
consequence, the socioeconomic gap between voters and nonvoters would be reduced as 
well as the correlation between turnout and electoral results. The level of elite 
mobilization effort is predicted to increase in closer elections. Elite effort boosts turnout 
because voters respond to the act-contingent incentives, those marshaled by political 
parties as part of explicit get-out-the-vote efforts (Cox, 1999: 389-90). Given that 
closeness varies across districts within countries, the cost of voting can be different for 
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two individuals with the same socioeconomic status and therefore their probability of 
voting. This impact of closeness is exacerbated if there is strategic abstention, with 
voters not showing up for non-competitive elections.4  
 
More importantly, the strength of the relationship between turnout and electoral 
results should be negatively correlated with the number of viable parties in a district or 
polity, If there are only two parties, one rightist and the other leftist, voters dissatisfied 
with his/her “natural” party will have a higher probability of being abstainers (and the 
other way around) than when there are other (minor) parties that can channel the 
dissatisfaction. In other words, the correlation between turnout and electoral results 
should be higher when a voter has two possible actions –loyalty or exit- instead of three 
–loyalty, voice or exit.   
 
Similarly, social class does not shape voting behaviour by default. As explained 
by Przeworski and Sprague (1986: 7-9, 11), “class, religion, ethnic, race, or nation do 
not happen spontaneously as reflections of objective conditions in the psyches of 
individuals … The organization of politics in terms of class is not inevitable … the 
salience of class as political behaviour can be attributed to the strategies pursued by 
political parties, especially parties of the Left”. More recently, Anderson and Beramendi 
(2012) have shown that countries’ income distributions and the presence of left party 
competition provide different incentives for left parties to mobilize lower income 
voters: the association between income inequality and turnout is muted by the presence 
of several parties on the left side of the political spectrum. Accordingly, whether 
citizens vote according to their SES is an empirical issue and clearly it should vary 
across countries and over time.  
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Finally, when analyzing the partisan consequences of turnout, controlling for the 
anti-incumbent effect is crucial. As outlined by Grofman et al (1999), all else equal, 
higher turnout will be associated with lower vote share for the incumbent party, 
independently on whether it is a leftist or a rightist party. There are two mechanisms for 
this expectation (Hansford and Gomez, 2010: 270-1). First, the conditions that cause 
voters to reject the incumbent party may also cause more voters to turn out at the polls. 
Second, since core voters are on average more supportive of the governmental status 
quo than peripheral voters, the more peripheral voters are involved in an election, the 
worse the incumbent party’s candidate will do.  
 
Taking into account simultaneously the SES model and the anti-incumbent 
effect, the partisan consequences of turnout in the short-term will be particularly 
important when both variables push in the same direction, that is, when turnout is high 
and the incumbent party is rightist. On the contrary, the sign of the correlation between 
turnout and the left share of the vote will be not clear when turnout is high and the 
incumbent party is leftist, since the SES model predicts a positive correlation and the 
anti-incumbent effect a negative one. In sum, as shown in Table 1, and assuming the 
existence of class voting, there is a clear interaction between the SES model and the 
anti-incumbent effect when linking voter turnout and electoral results.  
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Table 1: 
The partisan consequences of turnout in the short-term  
(assuming the existence of class voting)* 
  Turnout 
(mobilization of peripheral voters) 
  High Low 
Incumbent Leftist ? (?) ? (?) 
Rightist + (–) – (+) 
*In each cell, the first sign is the expected impact for the left share of the vote; 
 in parentheses, the impact for the right share of the vote. 
 
On the basis of these arguments, the correlation between turnout and the left 
share of the vote in the long and short-terms can be formulated as follows: 
 
• The left share of the vote is higher (lower) on average when turnout is high 
(low) if and only if social class shapes voting behaviour. If n elections are 
studied, the incumbent effect is canceled or at least tends to zero because there 
are alternating leftist and rightist governments. That is, class voting is a 
necessary and sufficient condition for observing the correlation between 
electoral results and turnout in the long-term. 
 
• The left share of the vote does not increase (decrease) between elections when 
turnout rises (decreases) if social class does not shape voting behaviour, 
independently of the incumbent effect. That is, no class voting is a necessary 
and sufficient condition for not observing the correlation between electoral 
results and turnout in the short-term. 
 
• The left share of the vote increases (decreases) between elections when turnout 
rises (decreases) if social class shapes voting behaviour and the leftist party is 
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the challenger. However, if the leftist party is the incumbent, the sign of the 
correlation is not clear, since the impact of class voting and the incumbent effect 
go in opposite directions. That is, class voting plus a leftist challenger generate 
a positive correlation between electoral results and turnout in the short-term, 
while class voting plus a leftist incumbent generate a weaker correlation with an 
unpredictable sign. 
 
In Table 2 these different combinations of the long and short-term correlations 
between the left share of the vote and turnout in three hypothetical countries are 
displayed. In Country C the correlation exits both in the long and short-term, in Country 
A only in the long-term, and in Country B neither in the long nor the short-tem. 
Accordingly, model specification in statistical analyses has to respond to these different 
patterns. For instance, a model in which the left share of the vote and turnout are 
differenced partially captures the relationship between the two variables in Country C, 
but would lead to wrongly conclude that the correlation does not exist in Country A, In 
sum, four conclusions emerge from here: (i) there is not a straightforward relationship 
between turnout and electoral results; (ii) the determinants of the correlation in the long 
and short-term are not identical, (iii) class voting is a necessary and sufficient condition 
for the correlation a in the long-term, but only necessary in the short-term, and (iv) the 
selection of a particular model specification is not an option for the researcher, but 
imposed by data. 
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Table 2. Three hypothetical cases of correlation between turnout and the left share of the vote 
  Elections Correlation 
Countries (%) t t+1 t+2 Long-term Short-term 
A Turnout 80 78 80 Yes No 
 Left share of the vote 45 46 45   
B Turnout 50 52 50 No No 
 Left share of the vote 45 45 45   
C Turnout 78 80 78 Yes Yes 
 Left share of the vote 45 46 45   
 
 
3. Data and measures 
In order to better address the puzzle of the partisan consequences of turnout, we look at 
data at the district level in Lower House elections within two individual countries, 
Portugal (1975-2009)5 and Spain (1977-2008).6 There are four reasons for this research 
design. First, cross-sectional studies of turnout are subject to limitations, particularly the 
omission of important factors (Blais, 2006). Second, because it is easier to register in 
some countries than in others, turnout measures are not strictly comparable (Blais and 
Aarts, 2006). Third, to the best of our knowledge, data measuring the strength of class 
voting across a significant number of countries and over time (decades) are not 
available. Fourth consequently, the selection of Portugal and Spain allows us to focus 
on the variation in class voting amongst others that do not differ. The two countries are 
third-wave democracies with similar electoral systems, but with a considerable variation 
in the impact of social class on party choice.7  
 
Unfortunately, the first comprehensive scientific national election survey in 
Portugal was not conducted until 2002 (Lewis-Beck and Lobo, 2011: 294). Therefore, 
instead of measuring class voting over time using logistic modeling techniques such as 
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the Kappa or the Lambda indexes, for instance, (Evans, 2000), the different saliency of 
class voting in Portugal and Spain will be shown according to the existing research.  
Using different methods and data, the finding that class voting is weak or even absent in 
Portugal and stronger in Spain is largely consensual in the literature. First, according to 
Freire (2006: 364-365), the weight of social class (a typology based on occupation and 
number of employees) in explaining individual left-right placement is three/four times 
higher in Spain than in Portugal in different moments in time. Not surprisingly, Portugal 
is at the bottom in the sample of 12 countries and Spain is at the top. Second, Gunther 
and Montero (2001: 120) show that class explains the 16 percent of the vote in 1983 in 
Portugal and the 6 percent in 1993, while in Spain the percentages are 19 and 10, 
respectively. Third, relying on multilevel models of voting behaviour in Southern 
Europe in the period 1985-1999, Freire and Costa Lobo (2005: 510-11) conclude that 
“in the Portuguese case, the impact of social class’ indicators on the vote is never 
significant ... in the Spanish case ... cleavage voting is more important than in Portugal: 
contrary to the latter, in the former case both education and head of household income 
have a significant impact on the vote ... class cleavage is more important in Spain than 
in Portugal”. In the same vein, according to Knutsen and Scarbrough (1998: 504-505), 
the coefficients for both the bivariate and the “controlled” effects of social class on 
party choice –measured by occupation, education, and household income- is more than 
double in Spain than Portugal. While Portugal shows the weakest correlations in the 
sample of 13 countries (0.06), Spain is in the middle (0.12, 0.14). Fifth, in a recent piece 
estimating dynamic, multi-equation models with two-stage, instrumental variable 
regression procedures, Lewis-Beck and Lobo (2011: 299:301) found that social 
structures measures (education and income) does not affect voting in the 2005 
legislative election. Finally, using qualitative evidence, Fishman (2011) in his 
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comparison of democratic outcomes in Spain and Portugal post dictatorship, also 
concludes that Spain and Portugal have different underlying societal class dynamics. He 
finds that the inverse hierarchical class structure that was established in Portugal during 
the revolution with its consensual and inclusive elements, cooled animosities among 
classes which still persists today. Whereas, in Spain, Fishman argues, the 
democratization was state-constructed and less-consensual, and therefore caused the 
marginalization of certain groups. This theory complements Chhibber and Torcal´s 
assertion that it was the political parties in Spain (particularly the socialist party) that 
eventually tapped into these societal class differences and managed to capitalize on 
them through mobilization and the politicization of social divisions. 
 
On the other hand, elections in Spain and Portugal are held by D´Hondt formula 
in one-tier electoral systems with closed party lists. The 52 districts in Spain (2008 
election) range from 1 to 35 seats, while in Portugal (resident in 2009 election) the 20 
districts range from 2 to 47 seats. Mean district magnitude is 6.7 Spain and 11.3 in 
Portugal.8 While there is a sizable difference in the mean district magnitudes of Spain 
and Portugal, we do not foresee this being a problem. If the effective number of parties 
at the district level were linearly correlated with district magnitude, we may expect 
turnout in districts to increase with the number of seats and the number of parties 
competing, however Selb and Grofman (2011) have recently found that this is not the 
case and this relationship is non-linear. They find that district magnitude plays a role in 
shaping the relationship between turnout and the effective number of parties when a 
district magnitude is equal to one or when a district magnitude is greater than one. But it 
is not expected that turnout will increase as district magnitude increases. Additionally, 
there is a (virtually irrelevant) 3% threshold at the district level in Spain, but not in 
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Portugal. In sum, although party systems in Portugal and Spain are not identical at the 
national level nor at the district level (more national leftist parties in Portugal than in 
Spain and strong sub-national parties in Spain and not in Portugal), they share the 
crucial characteristic demanded by our argument: the existence of one main party on the 
left and the right and at least one challenger on the left channelling the dissatisfaction 
with the Socialist Party instead of staying at home. Similarly, as they have quite similar 
electoral systems, the impact of closeness is constant. 
 
Nevertheless, there are some obvious differences in the institutional 
arrangements of Portugal and Spain. While Spain is parliamentary and decentralized, 
Portugal is semi-presidential and unitary. Whether a country is more decentralized does 
not seem to have an impact on turnout in national elections (Blais and Carty 1990; 
Black 1991), so we do not see this as impacting our results. Research is thin on 
presidential systems and the potential impact on turnout. As Blais et al (2011: 301) 
summarize, “no one work has carefully tested whether turnout declines in legislative 
elections when there is a powerful president”. For instance, Anduiza (1999:162 ff) 
considers the institutional relevance of national parliaments as inversely related to the 
existence of an elected president, regional parliaments with political autonomy, and 
direct democracy institutions. However of these variables only the last one remains a 
significant predictor of turnout in national elections in Western Europe. Things are even 
less clear when the question is in what way –if any– turnout may be affected by a semi-
presidential system.  
 
In sum, given that we are not accounting for differences in turnout between the 
two countries, but differences in the correlation between turnout and the left share of the 
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vote, with the exception of the party system, institutional variables do not play any role 
as they are constant over time. For instance, the impact of having a parliamentary or a 
semi-presidential system should be the same in the founding election as in the following 
elections. 
 
According to the previous discussion, and given the different saliency of class 
voting in both countries, our expectation is that the correlation between turnout and the 
left share of the vote should be weak in Portugal both in the long and the short-term. In 
Spain it should be much stronger in the long-term and, when the Socialist Party is the 
challenger, also in the short-term.  
 
4. Estimation methods and results 
Testing the argument that left parties benefit from high turnout requires that we properly 
identify whether the causal effect of turnout rates on the left share of the vote takes 
place in the short or long-term or both. To address this issue in our estimations, cross-
sectional and time series-cross section models are estimated. 
 
Cross-sectional analyses  
When analyzing the long-term relationship between turnout and the left share of 
the vote, we run the following model: 
 
      [1] 
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Here Left is the share of the vote of the main leftist party in national elections, the 
Socialist Party, PS in Portugal and PSOE in Spain, respectively;9 Turnout is the 
percentage of registered voters who cast votes in national elections, and  is a residual 
error term. Districts are indexed by i = 1,… J. As the two variables are district-level 
averages for all the elections, this model captures whether the left share of the vote is 
higher on average when turnout is high. The number of observations is 20 in Portugal 
and 52 in Spain. 
 
On the other hand, when analyzing the short-term relationship, we run three 
models:  
 
      [2] 
This is the same as Model 1 but with the dependent and independent variables 
differenced (by subtracting the value at the previous election). Districts are indexed by i 
= 1, … J and elections are indexed by t = 1,… As the two variables are differenced, this 
model captures whether the left share of the vote increases between elections when 
turnout rises. The incumbent effect is not controlled here. The number of observations is 
220 (20 districts × 11 elections) in Portugal and 468 (52 districts × 9 elections) in 
Spain.10 
 
    [3] 
Here the variable Governing (1 if the Socialist Party is the governing party; 0 otherwise) 
is added to the previous specification. That is, the incumbent effect is included in the 
model. The number of observations is the same as in model [2]. 
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  [4] 
Here an interactive term (between  is included. We are 
testing then to what extent the correlation between turnout and the left share of the vote 
changes depending on whether the socialist party is the incumbent or the challenger.  
The number of observations is the same as in models [2] and [3].  
 
Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 3. The most relevant thing is that the 
within-variation in Turnout in Portugal is double than in Spain, but the between-
variation is lower in the former. In other words changes across elections in Turnout are 
higher but more homogeneous across electoral districts in Portugal than in Spain. 
 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics  
Spain (52 districts ×10 elections = 520 observations); Portugal (20 districts ×12 elections = 240 
observations) 
Variable Mean Std. deviation 
(overall) 
Std. deviation 
 (within) 
Std. deviation 
 (between) 
Minimum 
(overall) 
Maximum 
(overall) 
Spain       
Left 38.31 9.75 6.77 7.07 14.50 63.67 
Turnout 73.68 7.05 4.78 5.23 42.20 87.60 
Governing 0.60 0.49 0.49 0.00 0 1 
Portugal       
Left 33.55 9.76 8.76 4.39 13.20 56.00 
Turnout 71.33 11.34 10.73 3.76 43.90 95.27 
Governing 0.55 0.50 0.50 0.00 0 1 
 
 
Results 
The least squares method is highly unsatisfactory due to the presence of outliers which 
can be supposed in the analysis of the level of nationalization in the sample of countries. 
The residuals plotted against the fitted values exhibited some outliers. In such a case, 
the robust regression is an acceptable and useful tool because it provides a good fit to 
the bulk of the data and exposes the outliers quite clearly.11 
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The estimation results of model [1] presented in Table 4 strongly support our 
argument. As predicted, in Spain the left share of the vote is significantly higher when 
turnout is high: one point increase in turnout increases the vote share of the Socialist 
Party by 0.51. The variable is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. However, in 
Portugal the relationship, although positive, is not statistically significant. 
Consequently, the partisan consequences of turnout are not particularly relevant in 
Portugal.  
 
Table 4:  
The partisan consequences of turnout in the long-term for the Socialist Party in Portugal and Spain 
 
Variables 
Models 
Portugal Spain 
Turnout 0.45 
(0.28) 
0.51*** 
(0.19) 
Constant 1.66 
(20.24) 
-0.30 
(12.42) 
F 2.50 7.55*** 
N 20 52 
Notes: Robust regression. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***p<0.01. 
 
 
The short-term relationship between the left share of the vote and turnout 
(models [2], [3], and [4]) is displayed in Table 5. Again, as expected, there is 
considerable support for the partisan consequences of turnout in Spain, but not in 
Portugal. In Spain, all of the model specifications indicate that left share of the vote is 
significantly correlated with turnout. According to the first model, the difference in 
turnout in a given district is statistically significant at the 0.01 level and has the 
expected positive sign: one point increase in turnout increases the vote share for the 
Socialist Party by 0.53. The coefficient for the difference of turnout and its statistical 
significance do not change appreciably when controlling for whether the Socialist Party 
enters an election as the governing or an opposition party. As shown in model 2, when 
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the PSOE enters an election as the governing party, its results are six points worse than 
when it enters an election from opposition. The variable is statistically significant at the 
0.01 level.  Finally, model 3 shows the interaction between if the Socialist Party enters 
the election governing or not and the difference in participation. The interaction is 
statistically significant, as well as its constitutive elements. Figure 1 shows how the 
marginal effect of the difference in turnout changes depending whether the Socialist 
Party enters an election governing or not.  
 
Table 5:  
The partisan consequences of turnout in the short-term for the Socialist Party in Portugal and Spain 
 
Variables 
Portugal Spain 
1 2 3 1 2 3 
∆ Turnout -0.14 
(0.14) 
0.06 
(0.10) 
0.13 
(0.14) 
0.53*** 
(0.04) 
0.54*** 
(0,03) 
0.74*** 
(0.03) 
Governing 
 
 -15.28*** 
(0.88) 
-15.70*** 
(1.00) 
 -6.00*** 
(0.45) 
-6.12*** 
(0.38) 
Interaction   -0.19 
(0.20) 
  -0.66*** 
(0.05) 
Constant -0.25 
(0.80) 
8.02*** 
(0.69) 
8.26*** 
(0.75) 
1.49*** 
(0.27) 
4.96*** 
(0.33) 
4.82*** 
(0.28) 
F 1.01 152.33*** 101.49*** 214.99*** 260.72*** 298.89** 
N 220 200 200 468 468 468 
Notes: Robust regression. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***p<0.01. 
 
In Portugal, as expected, the results of the Socialist Party do not depend on the 
level of turnout. The difference in turnout is not statistically significant in any of the 
three models and it only has the expected positive sign when controlling for whether the 
Socialist Party enters an election as the governing or an opposition party. Finally, the 
interaction between turnout and being the governing party is not statistically significant. 
As shown in Figure 1, this means that turnout does not play any role when explaining 
the vote share for the PS.  
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Figure 1:  The marginal impact of the change in turnout on the change in the left share of the vote in 
Spain (left) and Portugal (right)
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Time series-cross section analyses 
When using averages for every district in the whole period it could happen that results 
were spurious if turnout and the left share of the vote are dominated by long-term social 
trends. And even if the results are not spurious, cross-section estimates do not inform us 
about the existence and the velocity of adjustments in Left to changes in exogenous 
variables. Similarly, when using differences in turnout and the left share of the vote 
some parametric assumptions are imposed without being tested. First, the coefficient of 
the lag of the dependent variable is equal to 1. As explained by Fisher (2007), this is a 
problematic assumption, since parties that did well in one election are more likely to go 
back down at the next election rather than continue to rise. Second, the coefficients of 
turnout and the lag of turnout are equal in absolute values, but with opposite signs. If 
these two assumptions are not true, estimates would be biased. Accordingly, we have 
explored the robustness of our findings replacing cross-sectional estimates with time 
series-cross section (TSCS) analyses. 
 
The point of departure to analyze the dynamic relationship between turnout and 
the left share of the vote is the following general specification in which no assumptions 
are imposed: 
 
   [5] 
Where districts are indexed by i = 1, … J and elections are indexed by t = 1,… αi  are the 
individual fixed effects. Since the districts are a complete set and not a random sample 
from a wider population, a fixed effects model is more appropriate than a random 
effects model. As is well-known, when the lagged endogenous variable is on the right 
side of the equation, the initial impact or the short-term impact of the change in the 
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regressor x is given by its coefficient, while the steady-state or long-term impact 
depends on the value of ρ. In [5], the short-term effect of changes in Turnout on Left is β 
and the long-term impact is
1
β
ρ− .  
 
 
Departing from [5] three models can be derived: 
1. If ρ = 1 and γ= - β, then we obtain the “differenced model”: 
     [6] 
In this model both the dependent and independent variables are differenced by 
subtracting the value at the previous election. As the two variables are differenced, this 
model captures whether the left share of the vote increases between elections when 
turnout rises. This is our previous model [2]. 
   
2. If  ρ = 0 and γ = 0, we have the “model in levels”: 
      [7] 
Here the adjustment of Left to changes in Turnout is instantaneous, that is, short-
term and long-term multipliers are the same. 
 
3. Finally, if 0< ρ <1 and γ= - β then we obtain the “semi-differenced model”: 
 
    [8] 
In this model short-term and long-term multipliers differ, while the level of 
turnout is irrelevant. Only changes in this variable has an impact on Left . 
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Hence, the models [6], [7], and [8] are specifications nested in the general model 
[5]. Given that there are no ex ante reasons to select one of them, some preliminary tests 
are necessary before imposing constraints on the parameters ρ and γ. Finally, the 
variable Governing (1 if the Socialist Party is the governing party; 0 otherwise) is added 
to the previous specifications as a control variable to capture the “incumbent effect”. 
 
The first step is to test for unit root processes in both Left and Turnout in order to 
determine: (i) if we are dealing with integrated or stationary series, (ii) if the order of 
integration is the same, (iii) if they are cointegrated or not, and (iv) if differencing Left 
is appropriate or not. Two unit root tests for panel data have been run. The Levin-Lin-
Chu (2002) test or LLC assumes that each individual unit in the panel shares the same 
AR(1) coefficient, while the Im, Pesharan and Shin (2003) test or IPS allows for 
different AR(1) coefficients in each series. Both tests allow for individual effects, time 
effects and possibly a time trend and assume that all series are non-stationary under the 
null hypothesis. The null hypothesis in both cases is that series are integrated of order 1 
or I(1). In table 6, individual and time effects are included, but not time trends or lags of 
the dependent variable. The p values and the t-star statistic and the W[t-bar] when suing 
the LLC test and the IPS test, respectively, are shown. 
 
Table 6: Unit root tests: Series are I(1) under the null hypothesis in all cases 
Variable LLC 
t-star and p-value 
IPS 
W[t-bar] and p-value 
Observations (t*N) 
Spain    
Left -8.58 (0.0000) -4.65 (0.000) 9*52=468 
Turnout -9.33 (0.0000) -5.81 (0.000) 9*52=468 
Portugal    
Left -6.68 (0.0000) -3.78 (0.000) 11*20=220 
Turnout -7.09 (0.0000) -4.51 (0.000) 11*20=220 
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Clearly, the null hypothesis has to be rejected meaning both variables are 
stationary in both countries. Hence, the problem of spurious regressions and the 
potential lack of cointegration are not a concern. Additionally, using the lagged 
endogenous variable in levels on the right-side of the equation (as in specifications [5] 
and [8]) is more appropriate than differencing it (as in specification [6]). 
 
Results for Spain 
The results of the estimates of models [5] and [8] are displayed in Table 7. Individual 
fixed effects are highly significant, according to an F-test on the null hypothesis of 
irrelevance: F(51, 413) = 3.23 p-value<0.0000). Following Greene (1997: 598), we have 
calculated a modified Wald statistic for groupwise heteroskedasticity in the residuals. 
According to the results, the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity can be rejected (p-
value < 0.0001). Moreover, we have computed the Breusch-Pagan statistic for cross-
sectional independence in the residuals of a fixed effect regression model (Greene, 
1997: 601). The null hypothesis can be rejected (p-value<0.0001).  
 
However, serial correlation of residuals does not seem problematic. When 
computing the modification of the Breusch-Godfrey test proposed by Greene (1997: 
517), the existence of a common AR(1) process in residuals may be discarded.12 
Contrary to what Hansford and Gomez (2010) argue, endogeneity of variable Turnout 
may be also rejected according to the Hausman test, while multicollinearity is not a 
serious concern according to estimates of multiple correlations among regressors. For 
each regressor the coefficient of determination of the auxiliary regression on the rest of 
right-hand variables was calculated. All of them were below 0.59.  
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Finally, three more problems have been addressed: (i) possible biases in the 
coefficients due to the estimation of first-order autoregressive models with fixed effects 
(Nickell, 1981); (ii) panel heteroskedasticity; and (iii) contemporaneous cross-
correlation. To deal with problems (ii) and (iii) Panel-Corrected Standard Errors (PCSE) 
can be used instead of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) standard errors, following the 
methodology proposed by Beck and Katz (1995). In Table 7 t-statistics computed using 
PCSE are shown in brackets. While PCSE are substantially higher than standard errors, 
all independent variables are significant at the 0.05 level or better. Moreover, according 
to the Wald tests, we may assume the hypothesis γ = - β and the hypothesis 0<ρ<1. In 
other words, instead of using Turnout and Turnoutt-1 in levels, first differences can be 
used. On the contrary, differencing Left is not supported by the data. 
 
 Second, the coefficients do not change appreciably depending on whether biases 
are corrected following the proposal by Kiviet (1995) in columns 2 and 3 of Table 7.13 
Insofar as T=9, a bias of order T-1 is not as problematic as the most often cases of T=3 
or T=6 when working with microdata (Beck and Katz, 2011). Using estimates of 
coefficients ρ and β in column (3), one point increase in turnout increases by 0.473 
points the vote share for the Socialist Party in the short-term (the same election) and 
by.473 / (1-.465) = 0.88 points in the long-term. The lag of the dependent variables and 
turnout, independently on how it is defined, are statistically significant at the 0.05 level 
or better in all columns.  
 
Additionally, to explore the robustness of our findings we have calculated the 
system GMM estimator in column 4.14 We compute the two-step estimator and the 
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covariance matrix robust to any pattern of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within 
panel. Unfortunately, we cannot correct for contemporaneous correlation across panels. 
The only endogenous variable is Left, which is instrumented with its lagged values. We 
also include as additional instruments the first and second lags of ΔTurnout, and a time 
trend. The results for both the Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences, and the 
Hansen test of overidentification restrictions discard problems in both senses. The 
results do not change appreciably: the short-term effect is weaker (0.28), while the long-
term is stronger (0.66).  
 
Finally, in columns 5 and 6 the variable Governing is added to the previous 
models. In column 5 the LSDV estimator with PCSE is used, while in column 6 it is 
replaced with the Kiviet’s bias correction. The variable Governing is statistically 
significant at the 0.01 level and increases the R2 from 0.752 to 0.809. Using the 
corrected coefficients in column 6, when Governing = 1 (i.e., when the Socialist Party is 
the governing party), the left share of the vote increases by 5.8 points. Not surprisingly, 
the inclusion of Governing reduces the magnitude of the effect of both the lagged 
endogenous and ΔTurnout. The short-term effect is now 0.25 and the long-term effect, 
0.36. 
 
In sum, as in our cross-sectional analysis in Table 4 and 5, our results strongly 
support the partisan consequences of turnout in Spain; the left share of the vote is 
significantly correlated with turnout. According to the Wald test, the best specification 
to deal with this correlation in Spain is [8]. The difference in turnout in a given district 
is statistically significant at the 0.01 level and has the expected positive sign. When the 
variable Governing is included, and the potential bias in the coefficients is corrected, 
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one point increase in ΔTurnout increases the left share of the vote by 0.255 in the short 
term and by 0.356 in the long-term.  
 
Table 7: The partisan consequences of turnout in Spain 
 Models 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Leftt-1 0.372 
(10.53)*** 
[2.54] ** 
0.455 
(7.15)*** 
0.465 
(9.10)*** 
0.580 
(12.50)*** 
0.234 
[2.17]** 
0.284 
(9.02)*** 
Turnout 0.587 
(11.21)*** 
[3.27] *** 
0.569 
(11.78)*** 
    
Turnoutt-1 -0.354 
(7.13)*** 
[2.03]** 
-0.389 
(5.62)*** 
    
ΔTurnout   0,473 
(19.16)*** 
0.279 
(7.51 )*** 
0.248 
[2.11]** 
0.255 
(6.57)*** 
Governing     6.035 
[3.06]*** 
5.850 
(9.15)*** 
Wald test. H0: γ= - β 
(p-value) 
0.97 
[0.325] 
2.67 
(0.102) 
    
Wald test. H0: ρ=1 
(p-value) 
18.35 
[0.000] 
51.16 
(0.000) 
    
Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(2) in first differences 
(p-value) 
   0.743   
Hansen test of 
overidentification 
restrictions  (p-value) 
   0.290   
Observations (T*n=N) 9*52=468 9*52=468 9*52=468 7*52=364 9*52=468 9*52=468 
R2 0.752    0.809  
Method LSDV KIVIET KIVIET System GMM LSDV KIVIET 
Notes: t-statistics computed using PCSE in brackets in columns 1, 5 and 6; t-statistics computed using 
ordinary standard errors in parenthesis in column 1; bootstrapped errors in parenthesis in columns 2, 3, 
and 6; robust z-statistics in parenthesis in column 4 using the Windmeijer’s finite-sample correction for 
the two-step covariance matrix.  
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
 
Results for Portugal  
When studying the partisan consequences of turnout in Portugal, there are two crucial 
differences in comparison with what we have seen in Spain. First, Turnout and Turnoutt-
1 are highly correlated (r = 0.91). In order to avoid problems of multicollinearity, the 
hypothesis γ= - β has not been tested. Accordingly, in Table 8 the constraint γ= 0 is 
imposed in columns 1, 2, and 4 and the constraint γ= - β is imposed in column 3 to 
show how the results change when Turnout is included in levels or first-differences. 
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Second, individual fixed effects are not as relevant as in Spain. In column 1 we cannot 
reject the hypothesis of irrelevance at the 0.05 level and they are even less significant in 
column 3, when Turnout is replaced with ΔTurnout.15  
 
As in the estimates for Spain, the null hypothesis of cross-sectional 
independence of residuals is clearly rejected (p-value<0.0001) and serial correlation of 
residuals is even weaker. On the contrary, heteroskedasticity is not a problem now. The 
hypothesis of homokedasticity cannot be rejected (p-value=0.22), while residual 
autocorrelation is even lower than before. 
 
 Individual fixed effects are only included in column 1. Columns 2 to 4 are 
estimated by OLS including t–statistics computed with PCSE instead of OLS standard 
errors. When comparing the results for Spain with those for Portugal, it seems clear that 
it is better to start in the latter with the general model specification [5]. The results are 
very different from those corresponding to Spain. The lagged endogenous variable is 
statistically significant at usual levels, but not Turnout when PCSE are used. Moreover, 
the latter does hot have expected positive sign. Similarly, the variable ΔTurnout is not 
statistically significant both using PCSE or OLS standard errors, although it has the 
expected positive sign. These findings strongly support our argument about the crucial 
role of class voting when determining the partisan consequences of turnout. In Portugal, 
in congruence with the weak role of class voting, the left share of the vote is not 
correlated with turnout either in the long and short-terms. On the contrary, Governing is 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level. In sum, there is not evidence of a robust 
correlation between the left share of the vote and turnout in Portugal.  
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Table 8: The partisan consequences of turnout in Portugal 
 Models 
Variables 1 2 3 [4] 
Intercept  33.553 
[2.18]** 
14.870 
[2.13]** 
27.488 
[2.40]*** 
Leftt-1 0.318 
 [1.37] 
0.493 
[2.76]*** 
0.557 
[2.90]*** 
0.384 
[2.85]*** 
Turnout -0.377 
 [1.58] 
-0.227 
[1.25] 
 -0.175 
[1.27] 
Turnoutt-1   
[imposed] 
[0] [0] [- β] [0] 
Turnout  
 
 
 0.007 
[0.02] 
 
Governing    9.83 
[3.25]*** 
Wald test. H0: ρ=1 
(p-value) 
8.62 
[0.003] 
   
Observations (T*n=N) 11*20=220 11*20=220 11*20=220 11*20=220 
R2 0.466 0.384 0.324 0.614 
Method LSDV OLS 
 
OLS 
 
OLS 
Notes: t-statistics computed using PCSE in brackets.  
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.  
 
5. Causal mechanisms and individual data analyses 
According to our aggregated data analyses, while we found a positive correlation 
between turnout and the left party’s share of the vote in Spain, this correlation does not 
exist in Portugal. However, the individual causal mechanisms accounting for this 
correlation have been hypothesized, but not shown. Based on individual data, in this 
section we show, first, that there exist social and economic inequalities in both 
countries, but they are translated into different political preferences (the left-right 
dimension) in Spain and not in Portugal as a result of the higher importance of class 
voting in the former. Second, when abstainers are mobilized, they tend to vote 
according to their socioeconomic status and then are more likely to support leftist 
parties since they tend to be more ideologically left.  
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 In order to maximize the comparability of the data, we have selected two similar 
elections in each country. In the first one, the 2000 election in Spain and the 2002 
election in Portugal, a rightist party won the election (the Popular Party and the Social 
Democratic Party, respectively), while in the second, the 2004 election in Spain and the 
2005 election in Portugal, the rightist party was defeated by the Socialist Party. 
Additionally, in both countries turnout was higher in the second election than in the first 
one (from the 68.7 percent to the 75.7 in Spain and from the 61.5 percent to the 64.3 in 
Portugal).   
  
Relying on the first and second round of the European Social Survey, Tables 9 
and 10 show the placement in the left-right scale and the household’s income of Spanish 
and Portuguese voters and abstainers. Both Tables show that abstainers earn less income 
than voters in both elections and both countries. That is, voters and non-voters can be 
identified by their economic status everywhere. The difference is statistically significant 
at the 0.01 level. However, in Portugal the economic status is not statistically correlated 
with the placement on the left-right scale, although abstainers are more leftist than 
voters. Interestingly, when turnout rises (in the 2005 election), the ideological gap 
between voters and abstainers survives, although decreases. In other words, as our 
argument suggests and the aggregated analyses have shown, the correlation between 
turnout and political preferences is weak in Portugal. On the contrary, in Spain there is 
an ideological gap between abstainers and voters when turnout is low (in the 2000 
election), but it disappears when abstainers are mobilized (in the 2004 election). This 
evidence strongly supports our arguments and previous results.  
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Table 9: Voters and abstainers in the 2000 and 2004 elections in Spain 
 2000 election 2004 election 
 Voters Abstainers Difference Voters Abstainers Difference 
Placement on left right-scalea 
 
4.52  
(1060) 
4.04 
(242) 
0.48*** 4.38  
(1130) 
4.57 
(207) 
-0.19 
Feeling about household's  
income nowadaysb 
1.92  
(1217) 
2.05 
 (346) 
-0.13*** 1.82 
(1253) 
1.96 
(276) 
-0.14*** 
a (0, left - 10, right). 
b (1, living comfortably on present income, 2, coping on present income, 3, finding it difficult on present 
income, 4, finding it very difficult on present income). 
***p<0.01. In brackets, the number of individuals. 
Source: European Social Survey, First and Second Round. 
 
 
Table 10: Voters and abstainers in the 2002 and 2005 elections in Portugal 
 2002 election 2005 election 
 Voters Abstainers Difference Voters Abstainers Difference 
Placement on left right-scale a 5.18 
(887) 
4.91 
(270) 
0.27 5.07 
(970) 
4.87 
(275) 
0.20 
Feeling about household's  
income nowadaysb 
2.35 
(1029) 
2.53 
(383) 
-0.18*** 2.36 
(1302) 
2.47 
(512) 
-0.11*** 
a (0, left - 10, right). 
b (1, living comfortably on present income, 2, coping on present income, 3, finding it difficult on present 
income, 4, finding it very difficult on present income). 
***p<0.01. In brackets, the number of individuals. 
Source: European Social Survey, First and Second Round. 
 
 
 Given that ideological placements are not the same as party preferences, in Table 
11 we show whether low turnout biases election outcomes such that right-wing parties 
gain at expense of left-of-centre parties in Spain. In this empirical analysis, we have 
used a post-electoral 2004 survey undertaken by Demoscopia: the European Social 
Survey does not contain voting records from the last two national elections16. The 
evidence is conclusive. The 40 percent of abstainers in the 2000 election voted for the 
Socialist Party and the 20 percent for the Popular Party in the previous election. 
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Similarly, the 60 percent of abstainers in the 2000 election voted for the Socialist Party 
in 2004 and only 20 percent for the Popular Party. In sum, the left share of the vote 
tends to increase (decrease) between elections when turnout rises (drops). 
 
Table 11: Mobilization and demobilization in the 2000 and 2004 elections in Spain 
1996 election Abstainers in the 
2000 election 
2004 election Abstainers in the 
2000 election 
Socialist Party voters 40 
(175) 
Socialist Party voters 60 
(91) 
Popular Party voters 27 
(120) 
Popular Party voters 20 
(30) 
Other parties voters 33 
(146) 
Other parties voters 20 
(31) 
First, the column percentages. In brackets, the number of individuals 
Source: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (2382-2384 study) for the 2000 election 
and Demoscopia for the 2004 election.   
 
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we have tested the partisan consequences of turnout for Portugal and 
Spain. We have argued and further demonstrated the need for the inclusion of three 
elements in future studies, from a theoretical and a methodological perspective. As seen 
in our results, the degree of class voting in a country matters. The expression of the 
class struggle in the democratic arena is more salient in Spain than in Portugal and this 
is why we find a strong correlation in Spain and not in Portugal. 
 
We have further demonstrated that consideration of the relevant mechanisms at 
play in the short and in the long-term for the partisan consequences of turnout are 
necessary for better explaining fluctuations in the effect. The incumbent effect – 
whether a party is governing or not - is crucial for explaining the reduction of the 
magnitude of the effect of turnout on the electoral results for the left party, if they are 
governing, in the short-term. 
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Additionally, we have demonstrated how better model specifications can 
adequately test the assumptions of the model and solve issues related to spuriousness 
and multicollinearity and address some expressed concerns about endogeneity in the 
theory of the partisan consequences of turnout. Individual data analyses have shown the 
causal mechanisms behind the aggregated correlations. 
 
In future research it might prove fruitful to include all leftist parties when 
analyzing turnout and electoral results in the long-term. Aggregated results for leftist 
parties may better capture the full logic of theory. Accompanying survey research may 
also be useful to uncovering additional mechanisms at play in the short and long-term. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1Class voting refers to the tendency of voters in a particular class to vote for a specific 
party, rather than an alternative option, compared with voters in another class or classes 
(Evans, 2000: 402). 
2 Fisher (2007) points out a third question about the left share of the vote if everyone 
voted. But given that this is a hypothetical question, while the other two are about 
average behaviour, the former will be not considered here.   
3 However, this correlation is mitigated by the more volatile behaviour of less frequent 
voters. As DeNardo (1980, 1986) argues, peripheral voters are more likely to defect 
from whatever partisan leaning they may possess than core voters. 
4Additionally, as Calvo and Hellwig (2011: 39) show, strategic behaviors influence 
party platforms, generating simultaneously centripetal and centrifugal tendencies, based 
on the party’s particular characteristics. While non-proportional rules (and districts) 
crowd out smaller parties of more extreme policy positions, as voters defect from 
parties that expect fewer seats than their vote share, there is a centripetal effect of 
plurality-like electoral rules on favourably biased parties, e.g., parties positively biased 
in seats by the electoral rules. If the policies to be adopted will vary substantially 
depending on who is elected, so does an individual’s benefit of voting even when 
controlling for his/her SES. When Hansford and Gomez (2010) argue that previous 
work on the electoral consequences of variation in voter turnout does not account for 
endogeneity between turnout and electoral choice, they are mainly referring to (some) 
of these mechanisms based on strategic behaviours. 
5 The 1980 election has not been included. The coalition between the Socialist Party 
(PS) with two minor leftist parties, UEDS and ASDI, in this election with the remaining 
elections of the period makes the comparison not possible. 
6 Electoral results can be found at www.cne.pt (Portugal), and www.elecciones.mir.es 
(Spain). 
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7 See Blais, Anduiza, and Gallego (2001) and Grofman and Selb (2011) for similar 
research designs. 
8An electoral reform in 1991 in Portugal reduced the number of MPs from 250 to 230 
thus alter marginally altering district magnitudes. This change in district magnitudes 
does not change our results appreciably. 
9 Contrary to Fisher (2007), for instance, we do not include the results of more leftist 
parties, such as the Communist, in the dependent variable. Although the correlation 
between turnout and electoral results should also work for minor leftist parties, when 
the Socialist Party is the ruling party the incumbent effect would go against the Socialist 
Party and in favour of minor leftist parties. Aggregating their results would negatively 
bias the impact of the incumbent effect.  
10 As the variables are differenced, the first election (1975 in Portugal and 1977 in 
Spain) is not included.  
11 The results do not change appreciably depending on whether the estimates are OLS or 
robust. Nor do they if the outliers are simply omitted from the analysis.  
12 When regressing the OLS residuals on the lagged endogenous, the exogenous 
variables and the lagged residuals, a non significant coefficient for the latter was 
obtained (p-value=0.40). Robust standard errors to both cross-section heteroskedasticity 
and contemporaneous correlation were also used in this auxiliary regression. 
13 In order to compute the bias corrected Least Squares Dummy Variables (LSDV) 
estimators for the standard autoregressive panel data model, we rely on the bias 
approximations in Bruno (2005). Instead of calculating standard or robust errors, this 
procedure calculates a bootstrap variance-covariance matrix. While, results did not 
significantly change with other estimate options, we choose a level of accuracy of O(T-
1) and the Arellano-Bond consistent estimator to initialize the bias correction. 
14 According to Monte Carlo simulations with small samples performed by Soto (2010), 
the system GMM estimator has a lower bias and higher efficiency than difference GMM 
and level GMM. 
15 The corresponding F-statistic in column (1) is F(19, 197)=1.61 with p-value=.0576. 
In column (4), F(19, 198)=0.56 with p-value=0.9308. When correcting the estimates in 
column (1) for the potential bias according to the Kiviet’s proposal, the coefficient on 
was Leftt-1 0.425 and the coefficient on Turnout was -0.343. 
16 This survey was directed by Richard Gunther and J. R. Montero, and conducted in 
April-May 2004, covering a representative sample of 2.929 adult Spaniards. The survey 
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was financed by a consortium of researchers from Ohio State University, the  
Autonomous University of Madrid, the Autonomous University of Barcelona, the 
Universitat Pompeu Fabra, the University of Santiago de Compostela, and the Institute 
of Social Studies of Andalusia. 
